International journal of

ADVANCED AND APPLIED SCIENCES

EISSN: 2313-3724, Print ISSN:2313-626X

Frequency: 12
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 Volume 6, Issue 12 (December 2019), Pages: 41-57

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 Review Paper

 Title: The relationship between board committees and corporate risk disclosure in Saudi listed companies

 Author(s): Omer Saeed Habtoor 1, *, Waddah Kamal Hassan 2, Khaled Salmeen Aljaaidi 3

 Affiliation(s):

 1Department of Accounting, Community College, Northern Border University, Rafha, Saudi Arabia
 2Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, Northern Border University, Arar, Saudi Arabia
 3Department of Accounting, College of Business Administration, Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University, Al-Kharj, Saudi Arabia

  Full Text - PDF          XML

 * Corresponding Author. 

  Corresponding author's ORCID profile: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1632-1701

 Digital Object Identifier: 

 https://doi.org/10.21833/ijaas.2019.12.005

 Abstract:

Corporate governance literature acknowledges the important role of the existence and structure of the standing board committees, such as the audit, nomination, and compensation committees, in enhancing board effectiveness and thus corporate disclosure. Previous empirical studies on the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate risk disclosure (CRD) practices have mostly focused on board characteristics as key drivers of CRD. However, less attention has been paid to the potential role of board sub-committees on the level of CRD. To the best of the researchers’ knowledge, no prior research has examined the relationship between board committees and the level of CRD. Therefore, this study investigates the association between the existence and structure of board committees, such as the audit, nomination, and compensation committees and the level of CRD in Saudi listed companies. The study employs ordinary least squares and panel data analyses of the annual reports of Saudi listed companies for the years 2008-2011. The results show a positive influence of the presence and size of the nomination and compensation committee and meeting frequency of audit committee on CRD. However, no evidence on the impact of audit committee size, nomination and compensation committee independence, and meeting frequency. The current study contributes to filling the gap in the literature by investigating the role of further aspects of corporate governance on CRD. This study confirms the adoption of a coherent theoretical framework using a combination of disclosure theories to better explain the phenomenon of CRD and its determinants in Saudi Arabia. The study has important implications including provide vital input to policy makers, regulatory authorities, and practitioners in Saudi capital market and GCC markets and other emerging markets to improve CRD practices, optimize the structure of board committees, and enhance corporate governance effectiveness. 

 © 2019 The Authors. Published by IASE.

 This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

 Keywords: Corporate risk disclosure, Audit committee, Nomination committee, Compensation committee, Saudi Arabia

 Article History: Received 27 June 2019, Received in revised form 15 September 2019, Accepted 28 September 2019

 Acknowledgement:

No Acknowledgement.

 Compliance with ethical standards

 Conflict of interest:  The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

 Citation:

 Habtoor OS, Hassan WK, and Aljaaidi KS (2019). The relationship between board committees and corporate risk disclosure in Saudi listed companies. International Journal of Advanced and Applied Sciences, 6(12): 41-57

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 Tables

 Table 1 Table 2 Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 

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